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CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS

include a confession or written statement within
its scope.6 0 Unless where specifically decreed, a
majority of courts, however, have narrowly
construed the applicable statutes, holding that
a confession or statement of the defendant does
may be necessary or proper to be produced or exhibited as evidence on trial. Aax. STAT. ANN.

§

43-2010 (1947).
The court may order the state to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or other tangible things. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 909.18 (1944).
Upon motion of a defendant, the court, in any
case pending before it, may order the State's
Attorney to permit the defendant to inspect and
copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents or tangible objects, including written statements by the defendant, obtained from or belonging

to the defendant or obtained from others by seizure
or process, upon a showing that items sought may
be material to preparation of his defense and that
the request is reasonable. Rule 5, CRns. RULES OF
PRAc. and PROC., MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS
(1952).
See also, IDAHO CODE ANN. § R 19-1530 (Supp.
1957); RULES OF CRim. PRoc., 42 Mo. ANN. STAT.
105 (Vernon 1953); N. J. SUPER. and COUNTY CT.

(Crim.) R=sln 2: 5-8(c) (1948).
10Rule 5, CrMs. RULES OF

PRAC. and PRoc.,
MD. A~N-_.CODE GEN. LAWS (1952); MiNN. STAT.
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not come within the statutory language. 61 For
example, in a recent case, the Supreme Court
of Arizona held that under a statute similar to
rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant could not examine his confession prior to its being offered into evidence
at the trial.61 However, that court further held
that the statute did not prohibit such discovery
and that despite the statute, the court possessed the inherent common-law power to
compel discovery and thus, granted inspection
to the defendant.6 If this view were adopted
even in those states where the applicable
statute has been construed to prevent discovery,
an accused should nevertheless be able to examine his confession before trial, if such disclosure
is considered essential to a fair trial.
RoNAm N. MORA

§ 603.01 (1949); Senate bill No. 261 passed by the
1957 Illinois legislature and signed by the governor
July 5, 1957.
61See, e.g., Williams v. State, 143 Fla. 26, 197

So. 562 (1940) (other tangible things did not mean
written confessions.); Perez v. State, 81 So.2d 201
(Fla. 1955); State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d
881 (1956); State v. Echevarria,38 N.J. Super. 415,
119 A.2d 183 (1955); State v. Cicenia, 6 N.J. 296,
78 A.2d 568 (1951), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 925 (1955).
0 State v. Superior Court of Santa Cruz County,

81 Ariz. 127, 302 P.2d 263 (Ariz. 1956).
63 Id. at p. 265.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Confession Obtained During an Unnecessary
Delay in Arraignment Inadmissible.-The
defendant, a nineteen year old of very limited
intelligence, was arrested between 2:00 and
2:30 in the afternoon and, along with his two
nephews, was taken to police headquarters.
All were suspects in a District of Columbia
rape case. After being questioned by numerous
police officers for thirty to forty-five minutes,
the defendant spent the rest of the afternoon
in the company of his two nephews and his
brother until about 4:00 p.m. At that time,
all the suspects agreed to take a lie detector
tedt, but the officer who operated the polygraph
could not be found for almost two hours. Since

the nephews of the defendant were examined
first, the examination of the defendant did not
begin until after 8:00 p.m. The defendant first
indicated that he was guilty after one and a
half hours of steady interrogation by the polygraph operator. At about 10:00 p.m., after
the defendant had repeated his confession to
other police officers, the first attempt was
made to arraign the defendant, but this failed
because a magistrate was not available. Later
in the evening, the defendant signed a typed
confession. He was finally arraigned the next
morning. The signed confession was introduced
in evidence at the defendant's trial, the defendant was found guilty of rape, and the court
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of appeals affirmed the conviction. However,
the Supreme Court held that the confession
was obtained during an unnecessary delay in
arraignment and was, therefore, inadmissible
as evidence in a federal court. Mallory v. United
States, 77 S. Ct. 1356 (1957).
Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that an officer making an
arrest "shall take the arrested person without
mnecessary delay before the nearest available
magistrate," or other officer empowered to
commit, for the purpose of arraigning the
arrestedperson. (Emphasis supplied.) The Court
said that the above rule and related rules
formulate a procedure "that allows arresting
officers little more leeway than the interval
between arrest and the ordinary administrative
steps required to bring a suspect before the
nearest available magistrate." The Court
recognized that, because of the use of the word
"unnecessary" in rule 5 (a), some delay may
be necessary. However, the Court stated that
only a brief delay could be justifiably considered
necessary. An example, according to the Court,
of a brief delay would be a "quick verification"
of a voluntary statement made by an arrested
person. In addition, the Court said that the
delay in arraignment, in order to be considered
necessary, must not be of such a nature as to
give the police an opportunity to extract a
confession. Thus, the Court reiterated the
strict McNabb rule, and indicated that the
purpose ei excluding a confession obtained
during an unnecessary delay in arraignment,
irrespective of its voluntary nature, was to
punish the police for failing to promptly arraign
an arrested person. For a criticism of this
federal confession exclusionary rule see the
recent article in the March-April, 1957 issue
of the Northwestern University Law Review,
"Restrictions in the Law of Interrogation and
Confessions" by Fred E. Inbau. Professor
Inbau's article is one of a symposium published
in the Review uinder the title "Are the Courts
Handcuffing the Police?"
False Statements to Grand Jury Still Perjury
Even Though Correct Testimony Later GivenA known narcotic user, Jones, informed the
District Attornev'q office that the defendant, a

police officer, and his partner were demanding
money from him in return for police protection.
Jones was supplied with a small recording
device that successfully recorded a subsequent
conversation between Jones, the defendant
and the defendant's partner. Later, when the
defendant was questioned before a grand jury
about his conversation with Jones, he gave
answers that were false and he even fabricated
a different conversation. While on the stand,
the defendant was given the opportunity to
change his testimony and many of the questions were phrased with substantially the same
wording as found in the recorded conversation.
After the defendant became convinced that the
District Attorney knew the true contents of
the conversation in question, he asked permission to reappear before the grand jury, claiming
that the reason that he did not tell all the
facts in his prior testimony was his fear of
divulging confidential police matters. Upon
his re-examination, the defendant admitted
that his previous testimony was false and he
knew he was lying when he so testified. The
defendant was then charged with perjury and
convicted, and the Court of Appeals of New
York affirmed the conviction, with one judge
dissenting. People v. Ezaugi, 2 N. Y. 2d 439,
141 N.E. 2d 580 (1957).
The court rejected the contention of the
defendant that false testimony is always cured
when the correct testimony is later given. The
court stated that this ancient doctrine of recantation was not of universal application, for,
if it were, perjury would be encouraged. The
court held that recantation was an effective
defense "only if and when it is done promptly,
before the body conducting the inquiry has
been deceived or misled to the harm and
prejudice of its investigation, and when no
reasonable likelihood exists that the witness
has learned that his perjury is known to the
authorities." Thus, since the court found that
the individual circumstances involved indicated
that the recantation took place only after the
defendant became aware of the fact that his
perjury was known, and after the grand jury
inquiry had been hampered, the defense of
recantation was not available to the defendant.
The fact that the defendant was an experienced
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police officer who knew the effect of perjury,
and that he intentionally attempted to mislead
the grand jury with false testimony was also
considered by the court.
The dissent indicated that the test requirement that recantation must take place before
the inquiry is harmed is new and also hard to
comprehend. By its very nature, the dissent
pointed out, all perjury would tend to hinder
any inquiry. Thus, the dissent argued that for
such a requirement to have any meaning, the
perjury must have produced an erroneous result
in either an investigation or a trial, and such
was not the case here. In addition, the dissent
stated that requiring recantation prior to the
time the perjurer finds out that his perjury is
known severely limits the old recantation doctrine and drains from it all effectiveness. The
dissent claimed that a perjurer, who knew his
perjury was discovered, would no longer have
any inducement to subsequently tell the truth.
Attempts to Conceal a Conspiracy do not
Prolong the Life of the Conspiracy-The
defendants were indicted on October 25, 1954,
and the indictment alleged that they had conspired to defraud the United States by attempting to "fix" tax fraud cases. Because of the
three year statute of limitations, the government had to prove that at least one overt act
in furtherance of the conspiratorial agreement
was performed after October 25, 1951. During
the course of the trial, the government proved
that the defendants were successful in obtaining
"no prosecution" rulings in two tax cases from
the Bureau of Internal Revenue in 1948 and
1949. To meet the requirements of the statute
of limitations, the government introduced
evidence to show that the conspirators attempted to conceal the conspiracy within the
three year period. One defendant destroyed
records; an accountant, was persuaded to lie
to the grand jury; the secretary of one defendant was told not to talk to the grand jury; and
the taxpayers were repeatedly told to keep
quiet. However, the Court held that such acts
did not continue the conspiracy after the pur-
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pose of the conspiracy had been accomplished.
Grmnewald v. United States, 25 U.S. LAW
WIEEK 4322 (U.S. May 28, 1957).
The Supreme Court rejected the government's contention that the proofs showed that
a subsidiary element of the conspiracy to "fix"
the tax cases was an agreement to conceal the
conspiracy. The Court said that the record
failed to show any direct evidence, like an
express original agreement to conceal, on the
part of the conspirators to continue the conspiracy beyond the completion of the object
of the conspiracy, and that the government's
contention was implied from factors that can
be found in almost all conspiracies; secrecy
and overt acts of concealment. The Court said,
"'we cannot accede to the proposition that the
duration of a conspiracy can be indefinitely
lengthened merely because the conspiracy is
kept a secret, and merely because the conspirators take steps to bury their traces, in
order to avoid detection and punishment after
the central criminal purpose has been accomplished."
Veterans' Pension Payments Forfeited After
60 Days of Imprisonment-Public Law 85-24,
effective June 1, 1957, forfeits all Veterans
Administration pension payments, after a
conviction of a felony or a misdemeanor, for
that part of the sentence that exceeds 60 days.
The payments will be resumed after the person
entitled to them has been released from prison.
Pension payments are those payments made to
wartime veterans, or their eligible dependents,
for disability or death not connected with the
veterans' service. The new law does not affect
compensation payments made to veterans or
their survivors for disability or death resulting
from wartime or peacetime service. The law
provides that the Veterans Administration
may pay the forfeited pension of a veteran to
his eligible wife or children in the event of hardship. In addition, the forfeited pension of a.
veteran's widow may be paid to her eligible
children.

(For other recent case abstracts see "Police Sctenc.
Legal Abstracts and Notes", infra pp. 353-355)

